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Abstract 
This article examines how microstructure effects, evident in high frequency data, influence 
bid-ask  spreads  and  volatility  in  transaction  price  series.  It  uses  the  event  of  European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and the upheaval that this entailed, as an opportunity to empirically 
investigate  these  relationships  in  the  electronic  inter-dealer  spot  FX  market.  These 
microstructure effects  relate  to both price and time. There  are two price effects: 1) price 
discreteness and 2) price clustering, and two time effects: 1) the time elapsed between sample 
periods and 2) the time-gap between successive trades or quoted price submissions. Strong 
evidence emerges that all four factors are important in the determination of bid-ask spreads. 
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1.  Introduction 
This  study  uses  a  unique  and  rich  foreign  exchange  (FX)  dataset  of  global  inter-dealer 
electronic transactions to examine microstructural effects in the spot foreign exchange market. 
This dataset enables us to shed new light on the debate surrounding the observations that 
trading volumes have fallen and bid-ask spreads have widened in inter-dealer spot FX markets 
following European Monetary Union (EMU). Our work provides a more detailed account of 
the changes that actually occurred at this time, because our data is more comprehensive than 
has previously been available. We are able to demonstrate that much of the change in bid-ask 
spreads and some of the change in price volatility can be explained by four technical features 
of high-frequency data, namely price discreteness, price clustering, the time elapsed between 
sample periods and the time-gap between successive traded or quoted prices. This explanation 
is in contrast to the hypothesis of market maker response to exogenous changes in volume as 
proposed by Hau, Killeen and Moore (2000 and 2002). 
 
Price discreteness means that prices or exchange rates are not an infinite number of digits 
long, but rather they are truncated to a small number of digits. In the case of the FX market, 
exchange rates are specified to five digit accuracy. Price clustering refers to the fact that 
traders may not use all available exchange rates uniformly. In practice, rates ending in 0 or 5 
tend  to  be  used  more  than  other  rates.  The  time  elapsed  between  the  sample  periods  is 
important for a very obvious reason - price levels can differ radically if data is sampled from 
periods  that  are  far  apart  in  time.  On  the  other  hand,  the  time-gap  between  successive 
individual prices is also important because it allows these prices to drift apart. When the 
successive  prices  are  transaction  prices,  this  effect  increases  volatility.  When  they  are 
successive bid and ask prices, the bid-ask spread is increased. 
 
EMU brought widespread change to financial markets. Much of this change is directly due to 
the  re-denomination  of  certain  instruments  from  Deutschemarks  (DEM)  to  euros  (EUR). 
Since these currency units are of different values, the nature of the price discreteness affecting 
instruments which are now denominated in EUR will be different from what it was under 
DEM. This point is exemplified by the fact that the smallest sized bid-ask spread and smallest 
price increment for the EUR are both 74% greater than that for the DEM, after controlling for 
changes in currency values. 
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It is an acknowledged fact that volumes have decreased in the inter-bank spot FX market 
since EMU (see BIS, 2001). It has also become increasingly accepted that the EUR/USD bid-
ask spread widened at the same time. Goodhart, Love, Payne and Rime (2002) attracted much 
interest when they argued that the change in denomination from DEM to EUR is sufficient to 
account  for  observed  increases  in  bid-ask  spreads,  post-EMU.  Their  “price  granularity” 
hypothesis combines the difference in price discreteness between the DEM and the EUR, with 
trader inertia in  setting bid-ask  spreads. These authors argue that the fall  in volume is  a 
coincidence  primarily  due  to  the  increased  use  of  electronic  inter-dealer  broking  and  to 
banking industry consolidation. This model was put forward in response to the controversial 
work of Hau et al. (2000 and 2002), who had suggested that lower FX trading volumes and 
wider bid-ask spreads since EMU, are both due to a decrease in “market transparency”. The 
latter hypothesis centres on the idea that the availability of fewer currency pairs after EMU 
makes  risk  management  harder  to  implement.  Hau  et  al.  suggest  that  this  causes  market 
makers to quote wider bid-ask spreads, which result in lower volumes. Detken and Hartmann 
(2002) used a wider but lower frequency dataset and reached a broadly similar conclusion to 
Goodhart et al (2002). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of 
price  discreteness  and  price  clustering.  Section 3  explores  the  role  of  time  and  duration. 
Section 4  reviews market structure and  the  unique  dataset, while Section 5 discusses the 
empirical methodology. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Importance of Price Discreteness and Price Clustering 
Prices move in discrete units. The exact size of these discrete units may be imposed by a 
regulator or an exchange, or it may arise as a market convention. Price discreteness is clearly 
important for bid-ask spreads because the minimum tick size places a lower bound on a (non-
zero) bid-ask spread. It also determines the increments by which this can increase.  
 
Campbell,  Lo  and  MacKinlay  (1997,  p.113)  used  a  sequence  of  stock  return  plots  with 
progressively finer scales to illustrate graphically how discreteness imposes structure on the 
sequence of returns. Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) found that “…the variance and…the higher 
order moments of the rate of return of stocks are upward biased due to the discreteness of   4 
observed stock prices”. Harris (1990) elaborated on the Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) result by 
showing that discreteness induces negative serial correlation in high frequency data. This 
occurs  because  discreteness  causes  the  high  frequency  data  to  overstate  the  volatility  in 
economic  value.  More  recently,  Osler  (2003)  found  that  discreteness  in  FX  rates  could 
contribute to excess kurtosis.  
 
The preceding discussion addresses how price discreteness alone affects the bid-ask spread 
and volatility. In its own right, price discreteness is obviously an important factor in shaping 
bid-ask spreads and price volatility. However, as Harris (1991) pointed out, if certain prices 
are used more than others, then the price discreteness effect will be compounded. This is how 
price clustering exerts an influence over bid-ask spreads and over volatility. This draws us to 
the question of why price clustering behaviour arises. 
 
Until recently, price clustering studies on FX markets were rare and primarily used Reuters 
indicative quotes data. Goodhart and Curcio (1991) was the only widely cited paper. The 
main reason for the paucity of research is the lack of appropriate FX data. This situation has 
now eased. Besides Goodhart et al (2002), Sopranzetti and Datar (2002) produced a price 
clustering study of the FX market, using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Using Royal Bank of Scotland data, Osler (2003) found that the clustering of “stop loss” and 
“take profit” orders at certain price points explained why certain technical analysis forecasts 
have predictive power. However, none of these studies have the richness of data that the 
present  paper  offers.  This  is  because  we  have  been  able  to  explore  global  inter-dealer 
electronic  transactions,  which  are  the  largest  source  of  trade  volume  in  the  spot  foreign 
exchange market. 
 
The vast bulk of previous research on price clustering focuses on the equity markets. The 
most notable contributions include Harris (1991), Christie and Schultz (1994), Christie, Harris 
and Schultz (1994), Kleidon and Willig (1995), Aitken, Brown, Buckland, Izan and Walter 
(1996), Grossman, Miller, Fischel, Cone and Ross (1997), Woodward (1998), Weston (2000), 
Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (2001) and Brown, Chua and Mitchell (2002). Additionally, some 
prior work focuses on futures markets, including papers by Ball, Torous and Tschoegl (1985), 
Brown, Laux and Schachter (1991), ap Gwilym, Clare and Thomas (1998a and 1998b) and ap 
Gwilym and Alibo (2003).  
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Over the past decade, most papers which address the subject of price clustering make early 
reference to Christie and Schultz (1994). In the early 1990s, these researchers caused a stir 
with a price clustering study, when they suggested that widespread NASDAQ market makers 
avoidance of odd-eights quotes could amount to tacit collusion to maintain wider bid-ask 
spreads. As they put it themselves, “[they] are unable to envision any scenario in which 40 to 
60 dealers who are competing for order flow would simultaneously and consistently avoid 
using odd-eighth quotes without an implicit agreement to post quotes only on the even price 
fractions”, and they consider this evidence of an “… apparent lack of competitiveness of the 
NASDAQ market”. This collusion hypothesis has gathered huge support, largely because the 
use of odd-eight quotes increased following the publication of their results and increased 
again after subsequent rule changes (see Christie et al, 1994). 
 
Several competent and convincing rebuttals of the Christie and Schultz (1994) result have 
emerged since their paper was published. These include Kleidon and Willig (1995), Grossman 
et al (1997) and Woodward (1998). On the other hand, other sources like the US Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission  (1996)  and  Weston  (2000)  seem  to  support  the  Christie  and 
Schultz (1994) case. The debate is still open. 
 
There are other plausible reasons, besides collusion, that could give rise to cluster patterns in 
price data. Yule (1927) observed that numerical clustering arose systematically from errors 
that people made when asked to read numbers from a scale. In the 1960s, a series of papers 
(Osborne, 1962; Niederhoffer, 1965; Niederhoffer, 1966; Niederhoffer and Osborne, 1966) 
began to explore the issue of clustering in the context of financial prices. Niederhoffer (1966) 
argued that price clustering could even be at odds with market efficiency. Niederhoffer and 
Osborne (1966) went on to specify profitable trading rules based on cluster frequencies. 
 
Utilising rules laid out by Harris (1991) for NYSE stocks when price increments of $1/8 were 
in place, Goodhart and Curcio (1991) compare “attraction” with “price resolution” as possible 
explanations of observed price clustering in the FX market, where the price increment is 1 and 
the full range of ten final digits is available. The attraction hypothesis focuses on the kind of 
rounding behaviour that Yule (1927) identified. The price resolution hypothesis, put forward 
by Ball et al (1985), asserts that price clustering is a natural occurrence in a market which has 
reached “the optimal degree of price resolution”.  This arises from the trade-off between 
increased price accuracy on the one hand, and the inconvenience of longer prices on the other.     6 
 
Aitken  et  al  (1996)  found  evidence  of  attraction-type  clustering  in  the  Australian  stock 
market. Kandel et al (2001) found the same effect in the Israeli IPO market. ap Gwilym et al 
(1998b) also find it for international bond futures. Ball et al (1985) not only proposed the 
price resolution hypothesis, but they also found evidence for it in the gold market. Goodhart 
and  Curcio  (1991)  find  evidence  in  favour  of  price  resolution  in  their  FX  data  and  of 
attraction in their bid-ask spreads data. Harris’ (1991) results for NYSE stocks are consistent 
with the price resolution hypothesis, and this is also supported by Grossman et al (1997) for a 
variety of global markets.  
 
Harris (1991) and Brown et al (1991) both suggest another explanation for price clustering, 
namely the negotiation hypothesis. This suggests that there could be a two-tier price system, 
which would give the appearance of resolution-type price clustering when combined. The idea 
is  that large  trades  result  in  harder  bargaining  and  progressively  more  finely  tuned  trade 
prices, while small trades are transacted with cruder pricing from a reduced grid of prices.  
 
Grossman et al (1997) demonstrate that price clustering is a both a common and a variable 
feature across global financial markets. These authors argued that, instead of NASDAQ being 
out of step with NYSE as Christie and Schultz (1994) had alleged, it is actually NYSE that is 
anomalous for its lack of price clustering compared with other markets. They go on to show 
that a wide variety of factors contribute to price clustering. Market structure can play a part. 
Also, whether the quotes are binding or not matters. Once again, these conclusions do not 
contradict  the  final-digit  price  clustering  pattern  associated  with  price  resolution,  but  are 
attempts to explain why this occurs. 
 
 
3.  The Role of Time and Duration 
Price levels can move substantially when there is a lengthy interval between the periods being 
studied. This is consistent with the idea of price being a random walk with drift, whereby drift 
components  grow  to  different  levels  over  time.  The  price  level  is an  important  factor  in 
computing  both  the  bid-ask  spread  and  price  volatility  because  both  are  calculated  as  a 
percentage of the price level. If price discreteness and clustering cause minimum bid-ask   7 
spreads or the price increments to be rigid, then a jump in the price level can account for 
observed changes in percentage bid-ask spreads and price innovations. 
 
The other reason time is important in the context of price volatility and bid-ask spreads relates 
to the non-synchronicity of quoted bid and ask price arrivals, and the closely related time-gap 
between successive transaction prices. These are very similar in spirit to the non-synchronous 
pricing effects described by Lo and MacKinlay (1999). This time-gap is often referred to as 
“duration” in the market microstructure literature. In essence, if the underlying price evolution 
process is a random walk with drift, the drift component will grow as the time-gap between 
trades  grows.  Thus  the  innovations  in  transaction  price  will  appear  larger,  which  makes 
volatility appear larger. In the case of bid-ask spreads, it is tempting to assume that bid and 
ask prices are perfectly synchronous. This may be true of a quote driven market where bids 
and asks often come from the same market maker at the same time. However, in an electronic, 
order-driven market, like the electronic, inter-dealer, spot FX market studied here, the bid-ask 
spread is made up of the most competitive bid and ask limit order prices at every instant. 
When a more competitive price comes in on either side, the bid-ask spread is updated. It is 
also updated when a limit order price disappears through execution. Decreases in market 
volume slow the arrival rate for both new market orders and new limit orders. As a result, a 
decrease  in market volume will increase  the average time-gap between  the  arrival of the 
prevailing best limit-order bid and ask prices. We can define ask prices as being a mid-price 
plus  a  half-spread  and  bid  prices  as  being  a  mid-price  minus  a  half-spread.  From  this 
perspective,  the  increased  time-gap  expands  the  drift  component  of  the  mid-price,  which 
drives up the observed bid-ask spread. This argument does not seem to have been considered 
previously in the literature as a potential explanation of wider post-EMU spot FX bid-ask 
spreads. 
 
The arguments in the preceding paragraphs hinge on the underlying price evolution process 
being a random walk with drift. Meese and Rogoff (1983) made the definitive case for the 
random walk part of this argument. The conventional view is that the drift component is 
governed by differentials in international interest rates or longer term bond rates, in the form 
of the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP). This is explained by MacDonald (1999). 
Garber  and  Svensson  (1995)  survey  a  number  of  random  walk  with  drift  exchange  rate 
models in the context of fixed exchange rate mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a vast 
empirical literature documenting the phenomenon of forward rate bias (see Engel (1996) for a   8 
survey).  This  says  that  UIP  does  not  hold,  which  means  that  the  forward  rate  is  not  an 
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. If the forward rate does not act as a guide for the 
future  spot  rate,  the  possibility  arises  that  the  drift  component  might  not  actually  exist. 
However, recent research papers by Mark (1995), Flood and Taylor (1996) and Froot and 
Ramadorai (2002) find evidence of a link between spot exchange rate changes and future 
interest rate differentials, but only over very long time horizons (e.g. 4 years). Nonetheless, 
this is evidence of a drift component. 
 
 
4.  Market Structure and Data 
There  is  one  other  feature  of  the  inter-dealer  spot  FX  market  that  is  important  in  the 
determination of volatility and bid-ask spreads. This is cross exchange rate arbitrage and the 
associated  phenomenon  of  vehicle  currencies.  The  best  way  to  explain  this  feature  is  by 
example. Consider an exchange rate system with three currencies: A, B and C. This gives 
three exchange rates: A/B, A/C and B/C. Suppose an exogenous shock causes A/C to rise. If 
there is no change in the other two rates, a riskless arbitrage opportunity arises. Currency A 
could be used to buy currency B and then currency B could be used to but currency C. Here, 
B  is  being  used  as  a  vehicle currency.  This  would  enable  holders  of currency  A  to  buy 
currency C at the old (cheap) rate. At the same time, they could buy back currency A and sell 
currency C via the new (higher) exchange rate, A/C. Such trading would continue until supply 
and demand pressures lowered the rate A/C and/or raised the rates B/C and perhaps A/B, 
thereby extinguishing the riskless profit opportunity. This will transfer an exogenous shock 
affecting one exchange rate to other exchange rates. In reality, exogenous shocks are probably 
rooted in the currency itself and are merely reflected in the exchange rates to which that 
currency is a part. However, we can not be sure that vehicle currencies would be immune to 
such  shocks.  If  they  are  not,  the  forces  driving  price  volatility  will  be  complicated 
enormously.  The  indirect  exchange  rate  using  vehicle  currencies  matters  for  the  bid-ask 
spread because that the combined indirect (A/B + B/C) bid-ask spread could be lower than the 
direct (A/C) bid-ask spread. If that happens, volume will move away for A/C and into the 
cheaper A/B - B/C combination, possibly obliterating A/C as a directly traded currency pair 
on the inter-dealer market
1.  
 
                                                
1 Vehicle currencies and indirect trading are strictly a feature of the inter-dealer spot FX market, as the wider 
spreads quoted to banks’ customers would preclude any arbitrage opportunities.   9 
In 1998, the Bank of International Settlements estimated that the total volume of spot foreign 
exchange trading was worth almost US$1.5 billion per day. After EMU, the total value of FX 
transactions fell. However, the FX market remains the largest financial market in the world, 
by many orders of magnitude. BIS (1998) and BIS (2001) both show that spot FX transactions 
account for a little under half of all trading activity in the FX market. In turn, inter-dealer 
trading accounts for about two-thirds of total global spot FX volume. Over the past decade, 
the importance of electronic trading venues in the inter-dealer market has risen sharply. BIS 
(2001) estimates that between 85% and 95% of inter-bank trading occurred over electronic 
trading systems in 2000. This compares with only 50% in 1998 (BIS (1998)).  
 
Even these large volumes understate the importance of the electronic inter-dealer market. This 
is by far the most transparent part of the spot FX market and, as such, it sets mid-price 
exchange rates across the entire market. Figure 1 helps to illustrate this point. Transactions 
between FX banks and their customers are bilateral and are not visible to other banks. So, the 
other banks can not use the buy/sell information of this trade to update their prices. However, 
customer transactions give rise to inventory imbalances. The bid-ask spreads on the inter-
dealer market are tiny compared with those that banks charge their customers. Banks can (and 
do) take on inventory from their customers and rapidly offload that inventory on the inter-
dealer market at near mid-market rates. (see Lyons (2001) for greater detail on FX market 
structure.) 
 
There are two electronic venues in the inter-dealer spot FX market, EBS and Reuters 2000-2. 
EBS is the global leader in foreign exchange broking and is dominant in the large currencies 
involving  the  USD,  EUR  and  JPY.  Reuters  2000-2  dominates  the  Commonwealth  and 
Scandinavian currencies. Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2003) provide a detailed description of 
how the EBS market works.  
 
EBS provided the data for this study. This dataset that has not previously been available to 
academic researchers. It contains spot FX quote and trade price data for eight currency pairs 
from the EBS electronic inter-dealer market. The quotes data comprises the best bid and ask 
quote  prices  per  second.  Trade  data  is  also  time-stamped  to  the  nearest  second.  No 
information about the size of each transaction is provided. The data consist of two separate 
sample periods with five exchange rates in each.  The first covers the period 01/08/98  to 
04/09/98 and consists of the currency pairs USD/DEM, USD/JPY, USD/CHF, DEM/JPY and   10 
DEM/CHF.  The  second  covers  01/08/99  to  03/09/99  and  contains  data  on  EUR/USD, 
USD/JPY,  USD/CHF,  EUR/JPY  and  EUR/CHF.  Each  sample  contains  20  days  of 
observations. In this study, the EUR is taken to be the linear successor to the DEM on the 
grounds  that,  pre-EMU,  the  DEM  was  a  pan-European  vehicle  currency  (see  Hartmann 
(1998)). 
 
 
5.  Empirical Methodology 
The first part of the empirical analysis consists of a comprehensive table of summary statistics 
which provides evidence of what happened to the exchange rates at this time, in terms of 
volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads. It also reveals the price discreteness properties of each 
rate and how the average time-gap between trades has changed. Subsequently, we consider 
whether a change in the level of the currency could have contributed to the observed changes. 
Deeper investigation of data characteristics involves comparing the traded volume of pre-
EMU and post-EMU currency at successive bid-ask spread increments.  
 
In the latter part of the analysis, focus shifts to the phenomenon of price clustering. The 
standard way to establish the presence of price clustering is to apply a c² goodness-of-fit test 
statistic to the observed set of final digits. If clustering is absent, we would expect to see an 
equal number of observations at each available final digit which would give a c² value of 0. In 
the spot FX data, rates can take on any final-digit integer value from 0 to 9. The formula for 
the c² statistic in this case is: 
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The c² critical value at the 1% significance level with 9 degrees of freedom is 21.7. 
 
While  the  c²  statistic  addresses  the  existence  of  price  clustering,  it  does  not  evaluate  or 
compare its level. Grossman et al (1997) proposed the standardised range (SR) as a measure   11 
of the level of clustering for comparison across different instruments. The formula for the 
standardised range is: 
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The absence of clustering would lead to a value of zero for SR. For the ten final digit data 
range analysed in the present study, 100% concentration would give an SR value of ten. 
The c² and SR tests address the existence of price clustering but reveal nothing about its 
cause.  
 
Our  next  sets  of  results  reveal  the  price  clustering  patterns  in  traded  and  quoted  prices. 
Goodhart and Curcio (1991) provide two ordered final digits groupings which align with the 
attraction  hypothesis  and  the  price  resolution  hypothesis  respectively.  For  the  attraction 
hypothesis, the following final-digits should occur in descending order of frequency: 0, 5, 
{7=3}, {8=2}, {4=6} and {1=9}. In other words, if the attraction hypothesis is correct, 0 and 
5 should be the most frequent, followed by the pairs 7 and 3, 8 and 2, 4 and 6, and, in last 
place, 1 and 9. We compare the differences between these groupings with the differences 
within  each  group,  thereby  developing  this  expected  ordering  into  a  newly  devised  test 
statistic: 
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An “if” condition statement is used to check whether 0 and 5 are the two most frequent final 
digits in equation (5)
2. If they are not, then the pattern does not conform to the conventional 
forms being tested and the test value is set to zero. Otherwise, the numerator of equation (5) 
takes the average of the observations for each sequential pair and then detects the minimum 
difference between each of these averaged pairs. The denominator calculates the average of 
the absolute difference within each ordered pair. The smallest difference between the pairs is 
divided by the average difference within the pairs. Note that the denominator will always be 
non-negative, so that a negative number on the numerator can never be made positive by the 
denominator. An attraction test score of greater than 1 denotes strong evidence in favour of 
the attraction hypothesis, for it shows that, not only are the sets of numbers of observations in 
the required order, but the difference between the set means dominates the internal differences 
within each set. To put it another way, the magnitude of the statistic measures the degree to 
which the between groups difference dominates the within group difference. Positive values 
below 1 also identify series with the appropriate rank ordering but differences within at least 
one  of  the  groupings  dominates  the  difference  between  the  groups.  Non-positive  values 
denote that the set means do not exhibit the ordering required by the hypothesis. In other 
words, non-positive test values reject the hypothesis , while positive values show increasing 
levels of acceptance. 
 
The second hypothesis we consider is the price resolution hypothesis. Once again, Goodhart 
and Curcio (1991) provide an ordered set of final digits groupings. In descending order the 
resolution hypothesis groupings are: 0, 5, {2=3=7=8} and {1=4=6=9}. Again, we develop a 
new test statistic from their expected ordering: 
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2 In the original Goodhart and Curcio (1991) specification, 0 was required to be strictly greater than 5. We relax 
this requirement, but still require that 0 and 5 both be greater than the other final digit numbers.   13 
Like equation (5), equation (6) depends on 0 and 5 being the two most frequent end digits. 
The numerator of equation (6) subtracts the average of the set that should have the lower rank 
from the higher ranked set. The denominator computes the largest deviation between values 
within  each  of  the  two  sets  and  selects  the  larger  one.  As  with  the  previous  test,  the 
denominator will always be non-negative, so it can never offset a negative numerator. As with 
the attraction test, a price resolution test statistic greater than 1 denotes strong evidence in 
favour of the resolution hypothesis. Positive values below 1 suggest the right ordering but a 
weak fit. Once again, non-positive test values show that the hypothesis is rejected, while a 
positive number shows acceptance. The higher the value, the better is the fit.  
 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics for the spot FX data from EBS. This table 
presents a series of variables  that were  used by Goodhart et al (2002) to evaluate ‘price 
granularity’  as  a  source  of  wider  bid-ask  spreads  in  the  EUR/USD  compared  with  the 
USD/DEM, using data from Reuters 2000-2. Price granularity is the same concept as price 
discreteness. As in Goodhart et al (2002), we compute series for percentage bid-ask spreads 
and for ‘pip’ bid-ask spreads.
3 Our computation method differs from Goodhart et al (2002) in 
some minor respects. First, we use the occurrence of a trade to define points in time which are 
of  interest.  Then  we  compute  the  prevailing  bid-ask  spread  at  the  time  of  that  trade  by 
selecting the most recently preceding bid and ask prices, but only where these are less than 1 
minute old.
4 Trades that do not have both bid and ask value less than one minute old are 
excluded.  
 
 
                                                
3 The term ‘pip’ is commonly used in the foreign exchange market in place of the word ‘tick’. It may be worth 
acknowledging the distinction that pips arise as a matter of convention, whereas ticks are formally enforced, 
usually by an exchange. However, in the present paper we use the two terms inter-changeably. A pip usually 
refers to the incremental value in the fifth non-zero digit position from the left. Note that it is not related to the 
position of the decimal point. For example, one pip in a USD/JPY value of 113.57 would be 0.01, while one pip 
for EUR/USD of 1.0434 would be 0.0001. The fact that the decimal place does not occupy a fixed position 
necessitates the introduction of a ‘scaling factor’ with the purpose of bringing the pip to the left of the decimal 
point. For example, the scaling factor for the USD/JPY is 100 and that for the EUR/USD is 10,000. 
 
4 Huang and Stoll (1997) discuss using a 2 minute interval, although they ultimately use an alternative method. 
Since our volume far exceeds that in their data in every case, we decided a shorter interval would be appropriate. 
However, the choice of 1 minute is essentially arbitrary. 
   14 
The pip bid-ask spread is defined as:  
pip = (ask – bid) * scaling factor           (1) 
The percentage bid-ask spread formula is: 
% bid-ask spread = 100 * (ask – bid) / traded price      (2) 
 
Goodhart  et  al  (2002)  chose  to  remove  non-positive  bid-ask  spreads  “which  primarily 
represent the matching of market orders on the Reuters 2000-2 system”. However, we adopt 
the view that in an order-driven regime, zero-spreads are neither erroneous nor irrelevant. 
Indeed,  a  theoretical  microstructure  model  for  order-driven  markets  by  Cohen,  Maier, 
Schwartz  and  Whitcomb  (1981)  found  that,  in  the  absence  of  exogenous  market  order 
transactions  costs,  the  order-driven  bid-ask  spread  should  collapse  to  zero.  The  spot  FX 
market is order-driven and so does not depend on exogenous market makers. For this reason, 
we do not remove zero-spreads from our data series. We emulate Goodhart et al’s (2002) 
practice of restricting datasets to between 06:00 and 16:00 GMT. 
 
Goodhart et al (2002) computed nine summary statistics, encompassing both the unadjusted 
and time-weighted average bid-ask spreads, which we follow here. The summary statistics 
are: average bid-ask spread in basis points (AS), time weighted average bid-ask spread in 
basis points (TWAS), average bid-ask spread in pips (ASPIP), time weighted average bid-ask 
spread  in  pips  (TWASPIP),  total  number  of  trades  (TRAD),  absolute  imbalance  between 
number  of  buy  trades  and  number  of  sell  trades  (ABIM),  return  volatility  over  5-minute 
intervals (VOLAT) which uses the method outlined by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and 
Labys (2001), the standard deviation of the bid-ask spread in basis points (STDSP), and the 
standard deviation of the bid-ask spread in pips (STDSPPIP). For TWAS and TWASPIP, 
each bid-ask spread is weighted by the amount of time that it persists in the market. Time 
weighting should give a truer measure of the bid-ask spread facing traders, as it increases the 
weight of long-lived spreads and decreases the weight of short-lived ones. Finally, we include 
an  additional  row  to  our  table  to  show  the average  time-gap  (ATG)  in  seconds  between 
successive  trades,  in  order  to compare  how  these  have changed  between the  two  sample 
periods.  
 
A number of differences compared with Goodhart et al’s (2002) findings should be noted. Our 
bid-ask spreads are narrower than those reported by Goodhart et al (2002). The fact that our 
data comes from different market venues and from different sample time periods accounts for   15 
much of this. However, the narrower spreads we report are also in part due to the fact that we 
included  zero  valued  spreads,  while  they  did  not.  More  importantly,  comparison  of  the 
changes  in  the  EUR/USD  with  the  USD/DEM  reveals  a  marked  increase  in  average 
percentage bid-ask spread but only a very slight increase in average pip bid-ask spread. This 
is consistent with Goodhart et al (2002). In addition, both studies also reveal a large decrease 
in volume, as approximated by the average number of trades (TRAD) and a large decrease in 
absolute  order flow  (ABIM).  Goodhart  et  al  (2002)  conclude  that  the  “price  granularity” 
resulting  from  rigid  “pip”  bid-ask  spread  quoting  practices  combined  with  the  re-
denomination of the currency pair, is responsible for the sharp increase in the bid-ask spread 
for EUR(DEM)/USD. Our results broadly support this conclusion. 
 
The evolution of EUR(DEM)/USD volatility is a lot less clear. In contrast to Goodhart et al 
(2002), who found that EUR(DEM)/USD volatility increased by 22%, we find that volatility 
for all currency pairs has actually fallen since EMU. This finding also conflicts with the 
majority of other studies, including Hau et al (2000, 2002), Galati and Tsataronis (2001), and 
BIS (2001). This aspect can not be explained by our inclusion of zero-bid-ask-spreads. Two 
likely contributory factors are that our samples come from different time periods and that our 
data source, EBS, is dominant in the EUR(DEM)/USD inter-dealer market in contrast to their 
Reuters 2000-2 which has only a minor role in this particular market. The TRAD results also 
suggest that Reuters 2000-2 lost significant market share to EBS after EMU.  
 
More generally, Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that bid-ask spreads have not widened across the 
board, despite a widespread fall in volumes. Volume (TRAD) is significantly lower for all 
exchange rates, except USD/CHF which rose by a steep 59%. It is interesting to note also that 
absolute  order  flow  (ABIM)  fell  drastically  everywhere,  except  for  the  USD/CHF.  The 
USD/CHF bid-ask spread might have been expected to remain unperturbed by EMU, since it 
was not re-denominated. However, the average bid-ask spread in pips (ASPIP) shows a sharp 
fall of 26%. This is closely reflected in the percentage bid-ask spread (AS) decreasing by 
27%.  The  average  time-gap  between  trades  reduced  by  38%  after  EMU.  This  throws 
suspicion on a larger drift component as the culprit for higher bid-ask spreads.  
 
The alternative explanation of market makers widening bid-ask spreads in the face of lower 
volume, proposed by Hau et al. (2002), is not credible because there is no evidence to support 
the  idea  that  any  participants  in  the  electronic  inter-dealer  spot  FX  market  are  acting  as   16 
conventional market makers. Indeed, only the largest banks would have the capital required to 
provide such a service and they are precisely the ones who could get a better return on it by 
providing a market making service to their (bigger spread paying) customers.  
 
One striking finding in Tables 1 and 2 is  that the average  percentage bid-ask spread for 
USD/JPY increased by more than a quarter after EMU, but the average pip bid-ask spread 
exhibited no change at all.  
 
Volatility is lower across the board after EMU. The fact that the changes in volatility for 
USD/JPY and for USD/CHF do not mirror the changes in their bid-ask spreads indicates that 
other  factors  play  a  determining  role.  While  it  is  true  that  volatility  is  comprised  of  the 
incremental move between successive prices, it must be remembered that the continuity or 
reversal rates of successive increments over the series also play a major part in forming the 
volatility value. In addition, cross exchange rates mean that each rate is not free to react 
unfettered to the forces acting upon it. In addition, we must recognise that a non-zero bid-ask 
spread can exist over periods where price does not move. Such a period will provide very 
different results for bid-ask spreads and price volatility. Similarly, bid-ask spreads may be 
stable over periods of substantial price moves.  
 
The fall in EUR(DEM)/JPY volume since EMU could be attributed to a change in vehicle 
currency behaviour. The DEM/JPY might have been seen as a viable currency pair for direct 
trading, while the subsequent EUR/JPY may be considered less cost effective. Instead, the 
USD may be being used as a vehicle in the latter case, i.e. a combination of EUR/USD and 
USD/JPY may be used in place of direct EUR/JPY trades. However, the puzzling picture that 
emerges from these tables is that for both of these currency pairs, indirect trading via the USD 
was more cost effective than direct trading. However, the saving on indirect trading over 
direct for the EUR/JPY was twice that for the DEM/JPY. By contrast, the rise in USD/CHF 
volume closely mimics the fall in EUR/CHF volume. If this is caused by vehicle currency 
activity, then the USD appears to have taken over much of the vehicle role previously played 
by the DEM in CHF trades, i.e. third party currencies now appear to be converted into USD 
and then to CHF, whereas previously the DEM had been the intermediate currency. 
 
There are two obvious potential sources of difference between EUR/USD and USD/DEM: 
unit change and inversion. EUR units are almost twice the size of DEM units and the quoting   17 
conventions for these two exchange rates are the inverse of each other, i.e. the new rate is 
“EUR/USD” whereas if the format of “USD/DEM” had been preserved, it would have been 
“USD/EUR”. In order to explore the respective effects of re-denomination and inversion, 
independent of exchange rate fluctuations, we need to control specifically for intertemporal 
fluctuation  in  currency  level.  This  is  the  purpose  of  table  3.  In  this  table,  the  observed 
minimum price increment is divided by the concurrent average exchange rate (over each of 
the two 20 day sample periods). This gives the percentage value of the minimum tick for each 
currency pair for each sample period. However, simply comparing pre-EMU data with post-
EMU data masks the denominational (minimum tick size) change, as well as any change in 
price level. In order to separate out these changes, we first compute the 1999 EUR average 
exchange rates and percentage bid-ask spread values. We then convert the 1999 EUR rates to 
DEM at the official European Central Bank (ECB) fixed conversion rate of 1.95583. The 
result is a set of DEM exchange rates that have no drift in value compared to the EUR rates. 
For EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF, we divide the average EUR rate by 1.95583. In the case of the 
EUR/USD, we divide 1.95583 by the rate to reverse the inversion. We divide the minimum 
tick size observed in 1998 and 1999, by their “constant price” 1999 exchange rates expressed 
in DEM and EUR respectively. The percentage difference between the actual DEM exchange 
rates and the “constant price” exchange rates is the percentage change in currency value. 
 
The results presented in table 3 show the percentage change in the currency value between the 
sample  periods.  Panel  A  shows  that,  for  the  EUR(DEM)/CHF  and  EUR(DEM)/JPY,  re-
denomination of these rates from DEM to EUR increased the minimum bid-ask spread by a 
mere 2%, when exchange rate fluctuations are removed. If the USD/DEM had been quoted 
inversely, i.e. as DEM/USD, whereby the constant price average FX rate would have been 
0.54260 rather than 1.8430, and if traders had only used final-digits 0 and 5 in the fifth digit 
position, this re-denomination change would also have been 2%. However, the USD/DEM 
was  quoted  as  USD/DEM  and  the  isolated  impact  of  re-denomination  on  the  inverted 
exchange rate is a startling 74% increase in the bid-ask spread. The change in currency value 
has a minor offsetting affect, as it tempers the increase to 67%. This vindicates Goodhart et 
al’s (2002) conclusion that the change in price discreteness was the principal cause of the 
observed rise in EUR/USD bid-ask spreads after EMU. Furthermore, it establishes that it was 
the inversion in the way the rate was quoted which increased the bid-ask spread, rather than 
simply the redenomination.  
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Panel B of Table 3 acts as a control. The same procedure applied to the non-EUR(DEM) 
based currency pairs shows that the percentage value of their one-tick-spread for is unchanged 
in 1999 compared with 1998, in spite of big changes in trading volumes and the market 
environment.  However,  the  21%  fall  in  value  for  the  USD/JPY  between  the  two  sample 
periods adequately explains the 26% rise in the average bid-ask spread noted above. The fact 
that  the  USD/JPY  pip  bid-ask  spread  is  completely  unmoved  by  such  a  large  change  in 
exchange rate suggests that the size and use of pip bid-ask spreads are probably rigid. 
 
Goodhart et al (2002) consider whether the market practice relating to pip quoting could have 
been changed to add a decimal place and so facilitate a reduction in bid-ask spreads, i.e. 
traders  could  use  6  rather  than  5  significant  digits.  They  conclude  that  this  could  have 
introduced  complications as  other  researchers found that  trade size and market depth fell 
when policy induced smaller tick sizes were imposed (e.g. Jones and Lipson, 2001; Goldstein 
and Kavajecz, 2000). However, Goodhart et al (2002) only considered the case of using a full 
range  of  10  final  digits  in  an  additional  decimal  place.  As  is  evident  for  DEM/JPY  and 
DEM/CHF in Panel A of Table 3, the spot FX market has used half-points in the past. The 
introduction of a half-point (0 and 5 only in the sixth decimal place) may have dissipated the 
increase in bid-ask spreads without introducing the complications outlined by Goodhart et al 
(2002). 
 
The reason that this half-point option for the EUR was not applied is probably due to the spot 
FX market convention of having prices that consist of 5 significant digits. USD/JPY, which 
has three digits to the left of the decimal point, is quoted to two decimal places. DEM/CHF 
had zero to the left of the decimal point and so could have five decimal places. The half-
points that were observed for DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF were in the fifth digit position. The 
half-point option for the EUR/USD would entail the use of a sixth significant digit. However, 
if this path had been taken, the percentage one-tick bid-ask spread would have been 13% 
lower  for  EUR/USD  compared  with  USD/DEM,  according  to  our  constant  prices 
methodology. This is in stark contrast to the 74% increase actually recorded.  
 
In the next part of the analysis, the pre-EMU DEM exchange rates and bid-ask spreads are 
compared with the post-EMU EUR figures. It is quite common in the literature to compare the 
legacy DEM with the successor EUR because the DEM was acting as a pan-European vehicle 
currency prior to currency convergence. This means that a transaction from outside Europe   19 
coming in to a non-DEM European currency would first be converted into DEM and then into 
the local currency.
5 The upshot of this is that the currency flows associated with DEM were 
much greater than could be explained by trade and investment alone. Hence, this provides the 
justification for comparing  the DEM directly to the EUR.  Alongside the DEM-EUR rate 
comparisons are two rates which were not re-denominated during the move from pre-EMU to 
post-EMU regimes. These are USD/JPY and USD/CHF. We then analyse the percentage of 
trading volumes at each different bid-ask spread level (measured in ticks) for all currencies. 
This reveals the distribution of trading at successively higher bid-ask spread levels in each of 
our two sample periods.  
 
Table 4 reveals the percentage volume at each bid-ask spread level (in ticks). The 1999 data is 
shown beneath that from 1998. The highest bid-ask spread shown, 6+ ticks, is a catch-all 
category containing not only the observations at 6 ticks but also all those observed at tick 
values greater  than  6. The table is calibrated in  half-ticks. For the USD/JPY, USD/CHF, 
EUR(DEM)/USD, EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF, there are no such thing as half-ticks and the cells 
are  blank  for  these  rates.  However,  the  half-tick  categorisation  has  relevance  for  the 
DEM/CHF and the DEM/JPY. These pre-EMU exchange rates were quoted to 5 significant 
digits, like the others, but they only ever used 0 and 5 in the final digit position is the data 
analysed in this study. In addition, recognisable price cluster patterns can be discerned in their 
penultimate digits, i.e. in their fourth significant digit positions. None of the other exchange 
rates exhibit a recognisable price cluster pattern in their penultimate digit positions. The half-
tick category is introduced as a device to facilitate the analysis of DEM/CHF and DEM/JPY 
price clustering behaviour. 
 
It is clear from Table 5, that in spite of the fact that the mean USD/JPY bid-ask spread has not 
changed, the mode has changed. Most trades in this currency pair now execute at a bid-ask 
spread of 1 pip, whereas pre-EMU, most trades were done at a bid-ask spread of zero pips. 
Table 4 also shows a greater concentration of USD/CHF trading activity in the first three 
ticks. After EMU, 85% of trading in this currency pair takes place within 3 ticks, as opposed 
to 72% before EMU. The EUR(DEM)/USD shows another shift in the mode from zero to one 
                                                
5 For example, an amount of JPY to be converted into FRF would first use DEM/JPY and then DEM/FRF. This 
path would be used because DEM/JPY and DEM/FRF were both very liquid, whereas FRF/JPY was not. While 
a bank’s customer would engage in a direct FRF/JPY trade with the bank, the vehicle currency behaviour 
described relates to what happens in the inter-dealer market when the bank converts the inventory arising from 
that transaction back to the optimal holdings it held prior to the trade (see Hartmann (1999) for an in-depth 
discussion of vehicle currencies).   20 
pip.  Pre-EMU,  47%  of  EUR(DEM)/USD  trades  were  executed  at  a  zero  bid-ask  spread 
compared with post-EMU, when 49% of trades coincided with a one pip bid-ask spread. 
There is also a very clear fall-off in volumes occurring at spreads with a tick-size greater than 
2. However, this understates the shift because EUR/USD tick units are 74% larger in value 
terms that USD/DEM tick units. As such, it would be more appropriate to compare each 
EUR/USD  tick  with  every  2  USD/DEM  ticks.  On  that  scale,  the  increased  volume  at  2 
EUR/USD ticks compared with the combined volume at 3 and 4 USD/DEM ticks is stark. 
This suggests that there are more observations at higher (adjusted) pip bid-ask spread levels 
after EMU, which could be due to larger time-gaps and increased drift between bid and ask 
prices. 
 
DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF both show clear usage of half-points which arise because they only 
used 0 and 5 in the fifth-digit position. The successor EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF rates are 
denominated such that a 0 to 9 range of final digits is used. It is clear that DEM/CHF made 
greater use of this half-point than did DEM/JPY. Like the EUR(DEM)/USD, the values of the 
EUR(DEM)/JPY and EUR(DEM)/CHF ticks are not equivalent. In value terms, 1 EUR/JPY 
(EUR/CHF) tick equals 98% of the DEM/JPY (DEM/CHF) half-point, i.e. two EUR/JPY 
(EUR/CHF)  ticks  is  approximately  equal  to  one  DEM/JPY  (DEM/CHF)  tick.  By  that 
comparison, the startling increase in volume that seems to occur at higher tick levels in the 
EUR/JPY compared with the DEM/JPY is tempered. Although, EUR/JPY volumes at higher 
tick (value) levels are still sharply higher, revealing that the composition of the EUR/JPY bid-
ask spread increase is very different from that of the EUR/USD and also different from the 
smaller increase in the USD/JPY. A pattern that could be consistent with half-point avoidance 
behaviour in the DEM/JPY seems to carry over to the EUR/JPY. Even after allowing for 
economic value, the shift in mode from 0 for DEM/CHF to 1 for EUR/CHF is stark. The 
narrowing of the bid-ask spread for this exchange rate arises from the sharp fall in the usage 
of high value spread levels in the post-EMU period. In other words, there is very little volume 
at above three EUR/CHF tick spreads, compared with what had existed above the one and a 
half DEM/CHF point level. Once again, this is evidence that larger time-gaps allow the drift 
component to expand and push the bid and ask prices apart. 
 
Changes in the patterns of price clustering may shed further light on why bid-ask spreads have 
evolved the way they have. Our attention now turns to these. All currency pairs analysed in 
this study consist of 5 significant digits throughout, as is the convention in the spot foreign   21 
exchange market. In the second sample period, all rates use the full final digit range of 0 to 9. 
As noted above, in the first sample period, DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF, only use 0 and 5 in the 
final digit position. This makes it difficult to apply the Goodhart and Curcio (1991) price 
clustering pattern tests to all currency pairs and sample periods. However, we found that 
DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF exhibited visually discernible price clustering in their penultimate 
digits, so, we apply these tests to the fourth digit patterns in these special cases.   
 
Tables 5 to 7 present summary statistics relating to the price clustering features of these data. 
In these tables, Panel A is formed using traded price data, while Panel B uses quoted price 
data  from  submitted  limit  orders.  Table  5  shows  the  final  digit  usage  of  DEM/JPY  and 
DEM/CHF, and demonstrates that both currency pairs did not use the final-digit 5 very much, 
but the DEM/JPY used it less than DEM/CHF. Table 6 presents the odd versus even number 
usage among full price points in spot FX markets. There is persistent evidence that even 
numbers are weakly preferred to odd numbers. Table 7 presents the chi-squared tests for the 
presence of price clustering in the spot FX market. In each case, the c² statistics emphatically 
reject the absence of clustering, and this is consistent across both the trades and quotes data.  
 
In Table 8, the standardised range measure uncovers pronounced price clustering in spot FX 
rates. The level of price clustering seems to have fallen post-EMU, in both trade and quote 
data, for currency pairs using the USD, compared with those using the EUR(DEM). The USD 
rates are the only ones for which a direct comparison is truly meaningful. The fall in USD 
clustering may be linked to vehicle currency status, since the volumes detailed in both CHF 
and JPY suggest there has been a shift in spot FX volume from DEM to USD rather than to 
EUR. Although USD/JPY volume has fallen, EUR/JPY volume has fallen even more. This 
may suggest that the USD/JPY’s role as international vehicle currency for the JPY has been 
strengthened, at the expense of the EUR/JPY.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 reveal the precise frequency of final digit usage for the spot FX trade price 
and  quoted  price  data.  The  detailed  breakdown  of  the  USD/JPY  data  shows  that  the 
dominance by final digits of 0 and 5 over the rest of the numbers has declined since EMU. 
USD/CHF experienced a similar post-EMU decline in the dominance by these final digits. 
This  should  decrease  bid-ask  spreads  and  price  volatility  for  these  exchange  rates.  For 
EUR/USD, the decrease in the use of final digits of 0 and 5 counteracts the 74% increase in   22 
economic value of the minimum tick size, tempering the effect of the latter on the average 
bid-ask spread.  
 
EUR/JPY  exhibits  an  increase  in  the  dominance  of  final  digits  of  0  and  5,  and  a  more 
pronounced cluster pattern than its predecessor. It must be remembered that EUR/JPY price 
clustering is in the fifth significant digit position, compared with the fourth digit position for 
DEM/JPY. DEM/JPY had half-points and made very little use of them. The economic value 
of  those  half  points  is  98%  of  the  EUR/JPY  full  point.  In  this  context,  EUR/JPY’s 
comparatively full usage of the entire range of final digits is important, as it reveals an almost 
50% drop  in the pricing increment  actually used,  implying narrower  bid-ask  spreads and 
lower volatility. It is thus surprising that Table 1 showed that EUR/JPY bid-ask spreads are 
actually 54% higher than those for DEM/JPY. Table 2 revealed an even steeper hike of 58%. 
However, the very high volumes recorded at EUR/JPY rates ending in 0 and 5 pull in the 
other direction and are consistent with the higher observed average spreads. These may be 
sufficient to offset the fuller tick usage. The fuller usage of the final digit range in EUR/JPY 
would also lead one to expect that volatility would be lower than for the DEM/JPY. Tables 1 
and 2 show that volatility is weakly lower. 
 
The price clustering evidence in Tables 9 and 10 for EUR(DEM)/CHF is weaker in both 
sample periods than for the other currency pairs. However, as with EUR(DEM)/JPY, we need 
to  consider  the  under-utilised  half-point  of  the  DEM/CHF.  Like  the  DEM/JPY,  the 
comparatively full usage of similarly valued EUR/CHF tick units points an almost 50% drop 
in the value of the pricing increment actually used. However, in this case, the very similar 
price cluster distribution patterns of the DEM/CHF and the EUR/CHF suggest that this price 
drop  is  not  offset  by  very  different  practical  usage  of  the  new  pricing  increments.  The 
unfettered lower pricing increment points to narrower bid-ask spreads and lower volatility, 
which were both clearly evident in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
In terms of our formal test for the cause of price clustering, the attraction hypothesis was 
completely rejected for all rates and sample periods (i.e. all test statistic values were zero) and 
therefore these results are not presented here. Table 11 presents results for the price resolution 
hypothesis test statistics. Here, the results fit the final digit usage pattern in the spot FX data. 
This is evident in both the trade and quotes data. Table 11 reveals that resolution type price 
clustering has decreased since EMU, except for EUR/JPY which has increased. In particular,   23 
EUR(DEM)/USD  price  clustering  has  fallen  by  almost  two-thirds.  In  the  case  of  the 
EUR/CHF, the apparent 54% fall in resolution type price clustering represents a decrease in a 
series  that  exhibited  weak  resolution  characteristics  to  begin  with.  The  remaining  results 
support the findings from the standardised range. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This article set out to document and explain the changes in bid-ask spreads and in volatility in 
five  currency-pairs  between  pre-EMU  and  post-EMU  periods.  The  data  used  shows  that 
volatility  fell  for  all  exchange  rates,  while  some  bid-ask  spreads  widened  and  others 
narrowed. Four distinct potential explanatory market microstructure factors for these changes 
were  explicitly  considered:  price  discreteness;  price  clustering;  the  inter-temporal  shift  in 
currency  value;  and  the  time-gap  between  successive  observations.  In  addition,  our  price 
clustering analysis makes use of new test statistics which we propose to capture behaviour 
described by Goodhart and Curcio (1991).  
 
The  four  proposed  factors  are  successful  in  explaining  the  observed  changes  in  bid-ask 
spreads, but are less able to explain the observed changes in price volatility. Also, our results 
overwhelmingly  accept  the  price  resolution  hypothesis  explanation  for  price  clustering 
behaviour in the spot FX market and overwhelmingly reject the price attraction hypothesis.  
 
In  the  specific  case  of  the  EUR(DEM)/USD  bid-ask  spread,  we  concur  with  the  price 
granularity  (price  discreteness)  hypothesis  of  Goodhart  et  al  (2002)  which  asserts  that 
redenomination is the most likely cause of an increase in the spread for this exchange rate. We 
proceed to show that, if FX traders only use five significant digits, then the switch from 
USD/DEM to EUR/USD quoting alone is enough to cause a 74% increase in the one-tick 
EUR(DEM)/USD  bid-ask  spread.  Furthermore,  we  show  that  it  was  the  inversion  of this 
quoting format, i.e. using EUR/USD rather than USD/EUR, that is primarily responsible for 
the increase. Other EUR FX bid-ask spreads did not exhibit this large increase. If the market 
had been willing to embrace an additional half point price increment by using 0 and 5 in the 
sixth digit position, the one-tick EUR/USD bid-ask spread would have been 13% lower than 
for USD/DEM, instead of 74% higher. The fall observed in EUR/USD price clustering had a   24 
dissipating effect on this. So too, did the inter-temporal shift in currency value. On the other 
hand, the increase in the time-gap between prevailing bid and ask prices exacerbated the rise. 
 
The  widening  of  the  USD/JPY  bid-ask  spread  seems  primarily  due  to  the  inter-temporal 
change in currency value. There was no re-denomination of the USD/JPY from pre-EMU to 
post-EMU  periods  which  would  have  enabled  price  discreteness  to  play  a  part.  Like  the 
EUR(DEM)/USD, the fall in price clustering should have had a dampening effect on the bid-
ask spread. On the other hand, the increased time-gap between bid and ask prices should have 
pushed post-EMU spreads higher. Finally, wider EUR/JPY and EUR/USD bid-ask spreads 
preclude any possibility that the EUR could act as a vehicle for currency flows between USD 
and JPY. This means, at the very least, that a factor which previously may have inhibited the 
widening of the USD/JPY bid-ask spread has become much less potent.  
 
The narrowing of EUR(DEM)/CHF bid-ask spreads seems largely due a near 50% decrease in 
the pricing increment used. Although there is almost no change in the value of the official 
minimum tick size, implying no change in price discreteness, the price clustering results show 
that the pre-EMU half-points were little used. The market’s preference for whole number 
meant that the increment used in practice was actually two ticks. In the post-EMU, EUR 
denominated world, traders used one tick increments. Exchange rate value levels and price 
clustering patterns over the range of whole numbers were little changed. The large increase in 
the time-gap will have tempered the narrowing of this bid-ask spread. However, there remains 
a nagging question of why traders should be content to accept smaller economic units than 
they had before. One possible reason is increased competition from USD/CHF. The trend-
bucking increase in USD/CHF trade volume closely matches the volume lost by EUR/CHF. If 
it is the case that USD/CHF has taken over much of the international vehicle currency role of 
the  DEM/CHF,  the  EUR/CHF  could  face  even  more  loss  of  volume  if  its  prices  are 
uncompetitive. 
 
Increased volume has reduced the time-gap for traded and quoted prices for USD/CHF. Since 
there is no change in price discreteness and very little change in the currency value level, it 
appears that the change in the time-gap is the leading contender to explain the narrower bid-
ask spreads evident in this exchange rate. The price clustering data also reveals a spread-
reducing influence in that it shows less use of extreme 0 and 5 final digit values. It seems 
plausible that reduced price clustering reflects more accurate pricing behaviour in response to   25 
increased  USD/CHF  volume  and  to  the  development  of  a  competitive  scenario  with 
EUR/CHF. 
 
The fact that CHF/JPY was never a liquid currency pair in the inter-dealer market combined 
with  the fact  that  the  CHF  has  never  been  considered  as a  credible  international  vehicle 
currency  implies  that  indirect  exchange  rates  are  not  a  significant  determinant  of  either 
EUR/CHF or USD/CHF bid-ask spread changes. 
 
Reconciliation of the evidence on the EUR(DEM)/JPY bid-ask spread is perhaps the most 
complicated. This spread widened by 58%. The value of this exchange rate dropped by 24%, 
which should indeed lead to a wider bid-ask spread. On the other hand, while the value of its 
official minimum tick size changed only by a very small amount, the value of the minimum 
amount in common use dropped sharply. This drop in the discreteness of prices used should 
result in narrower bid-ask spreads. However, the data show that the opposite happened. The 
size of the average spread in pips shows that it more than doubled after EMU. The price 
clustering results provide an explanation. They show that extreme 0 and 5 final digit prices 
are much more prevalent after EMU. This suggests that market practice caused wider bid-ask 
spreads. In addition, the time-gap between successive prices almost triples after EMU, which 
should also drive up bid-ask spreads. We must consider why market practice should have 
changed  so  much.  One  possible  reason  is  that  the  EUR/JPY  may  have  lost  considerable 
ground to the USD/JPY as an international vehicle currency. The respective bid-ask spread 
levels clearly  show  that  there  is a  substantial  saving  to  be  made, after  EMU,  by  trading 
EUR/JPY indirectly, using the USD as a vehicle. This provides the economic grounds for 
indirect  trading  to  flourish.  In  addition,  the  steeper  decline  in  EUR/JPY  trading  volume 
compared with USD/JPY, suggests that a shift from direct to indirect trading has taken place.  
 
This evidence of increased indirect trading from EUR/JPY and the two CHF rates leads to the 
startling conclusion that the advent of EMU seems to have strengthened the USD’s position as 
the  dominant  international  vehicle  currency,  when  part  of  the  intention  in  launching  the 
currency must surely have been the opposite. 
 
The ubiquitous fall in volatility is harder to explain. We believe that the latter may be heavily 
influenced  by  information  coming  to  the  market  at  specific  times  and  by  temporary 
imbalances  between  supply  and  demand  which may  differ  greatly  between  data  samples.   26 
Furthermore,  cross  currency  arbitrage  could  dissipate  across  the  market  what  should  be 
localised  shocks.  Such  issues  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  and  remain  for  future 
research.   27 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (Hourly data) 
 
 
Summary statistics for EBS spot FX with the data first aggregated into hourly units. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Statistics are 
computed in the same manner as Goodhart et al (2002), using the same 10 hour time window (07:00 to 17:00, London time). The original 
Goodhart et al (2002) findings are shown at the end. Since all the data comes directly from the original source (EBS), there are no missing data 
intervals due to system crashes as some previous studies have had to allow for. Average bid-ask spread and volatility measures are shown in 
basis points.   32 
Table 2: Summary statistics (Daily data) 
 
 
Summary statistics for EBS spot FX with the data first aggregated into daily units. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Statistics are 
computed in the same manner as Goodhart et al (2002), using the same 10 hour time window (07:00 to 17:00, London time). The original 
Goodhart et al (2002) findings are shown at the end. Since all the data comes directly from the original source (EBS), there are no missing data 
intervals due to system crashes as some previous studies have had to allow for. Average bid-ask spread and volatility measures are shown in 
basis points. 
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Table 3: Changes in the economic value of the minimum tick size associated with each currency pair at constant prices, and 
changes in the inter-temporal value of those exchange rates.  
 
 
 
* 1998 rates are adjusted to 1999 prices to remove fluctuations in the FX rate. 
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Table 4: Percentage of traded volume occurring at each prevailing bid-ask spread level in ticks. 
 
 
 
 
The DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF are special cases here. The half-tick level applies only to them and is irrelevant for all other exchange rates. 
Although these two rates were specified to 5 digit accuracy like all the other rates, they only ever used 0 and 5 in their final digit position. 
However, a considerable a considerable amount of dispersion of the volume traded is evident in the units of the penultimate digit. In the cases of 
DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF, the ‘tick’ spread levels actually refer to the units of their penultimate digit positions. 
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Table 5: Percentage of spot FX trades and quotes at a final digit of zero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of spot FX trades and quotes (limit orders) at odd final 
digits 
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Table 7: Chi-squared test statistic and number of observations for spot FX trades 
and quotes (limit orders) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Standardised ranges for spot FX trades and quotes (limit orders) 
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Table 9: Percentage of total traded (i.e. market order) volume at each final digit 
 
 
 
* Figures for DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF which are listed as 98* are for the penultimate digit. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Percentage of total quoted price (i.e. limit order) volume at each final 
digit. 
 
 
 
* Figures for DEM/JPY and DEM/CHF which are listed as 98* are for the penultimate digit. 
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Table 11: Price resolution hypothesis test statistics for spot FX trade and quote 
(limit order) prices 
 
 
 
* -  these values go to zero if the restriction of volume(0) > volume(5) is enforced  
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Figure 1: The Structure of the Spot FX Market. 
 
 
 
 